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FIFTY YEARS AFTER: A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE EICHMANN TRIAL 
Ruth Bettina Birn 
The Prosecution in the Eichmann trial exaggerated Eichmann’s 
role in the Holocaust, due to political considerations and ignorance. New 
information, including the reports of a trial observer, a German prosecutor 
experienced in Nazi crimes, helps to establish the level of knowledge avail-
able in 1961. Placed into the context of investigation files dealing with the 
most important Holocaust related crimes up to1961, an in-depth assessment 
of the extent to which the prosecution’s case against Eichmann reflected the 
historical facts is possible. Hannah Arendt and other commentators’ asser-
tion, that the Eichmann trial was instrumental in starting a wave of prose-
cutions of Nazi crimes in Germany, can now be shown to be unfounded. A 
close look at the Prosecution’s evidence demonstrates the problems associ-
ated with the utilization of post-war affidavits of Nazi perpetrators and the 
selective use of survivor testimony. This makes the didactic significance 
doubtful, with recent commentators attributed to the case. 
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I. A VIEW ON THE PAST FROM THE PRESENT 
At the time of a major anniversary—a half century—we do not only 
look back at the past event, but also measure the distance between then and 
now. What has happened in between? Has our knowledge increased? Has 
our view of the past changed? 
Concerning the Eichmann trial, recently discovered Israeli archival 
findings provide an in-depth view on the political background of the case. 
Likewise, the reports of a trial observer, a prosecutor experienced in the 
investigation of Holocaust crimes, now help us to assess whether the case 
against Eichmann correctly reflected the level of knowledge about Nazi 
crimes available in 1961. These two sources can assist us in taking a critical 
look at opinions about the Eichmann trial voiced in the literature in the last 
fifteen years. Was the trial instrumental in empowering Holocaust survivors 
by giving them a voice? Is the didactic result, the narrative generated, equal-
ly or more important than the strict observation of the rule of law? 
II. THE POLITICAL FACTOR 
The findings of Israeli historians add a new dimension to our 
knowledge of the political background of the Eichmann trial.1 David Ben-
Gurion, then Prime Minister of Israel and a towering figure in Israeli poli-
tics, set the tone when he announced Adolf Eichmann’s capture to the Knes-
set on May 23, 1960, calling Eichmann “the greatest war criminal of all 
time.”2 The trial was meant to remind the world that “the Holocaust obligat-
ed them to support the only Jewish state on earth;”3 to establish the Holo-
caust as a unique historical event; to educate the younger generation in Isra-
el about the past; to strengthen the Zionist narrative; and to create a link 
between the Arabs and the Holocaust. “The trial was only a medium . . . the 
real purpose of the trial was to give voice to the Jewish people, for whom 
Israel claimed to speak in the ideological spirit of Zionism.”4 Consequently, 
  
 1 See HANNA YABLONKA, THE STATE OF ISRAEL VS. ADOLF EICHMANN (Ora Cummings & 
David Herman trans., 2004) (2001) (utilizing newly available archival sources); see also 
TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION (Haim Watzman trans., 1993) (1991) (on the impact of 
the Holocaust and Eichmann trial on Israel). 
 2 Hanna Yablonka, Preparing the Eichmann Trial: Who Really Did the Job?, 1 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 369, 370–71 (2000) (quoting and translating Ben-Gurion’s 
speech, as recorded in 29 DIVREI HAKNESSET 1291 (1960)); accord JACOB ROBINSON, AND 
THE CROOKED SHALL BE MADE STRAIGHT: THE EICHMANN TRIAL, THE JEWISH CATASTROPHE, 
AND HANNAH ARENDT’S NARRATIVE 105 (1965) (providing a translation of the same state-
ment as “one of the greatest Nazi war criminals . . . .”).  
 3 SEGEV, supra note 1, at 327.  
 4 Id. at 358; cf. IDITH ZERTAL, ISRAEL’S HOLOCAUST AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONHOOD 
108 (2005) (“The desire to legitimize the will to power was the sub-text of the entire trial and 
the discourse which grew out of it.”). 
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Ben-Gurion attacked critics who argued that Eichmann should be tried by 
an international court as anti-Semites or Jews with an inferiority complex.5 
The Israeli government invested a lot to give the trial as much media promi-
nence as possible.6 A specific view on history—“The subject of the trial was 
Jewish suffering: the Jewish nation was presented as a constant victim 
throughout history”7—was clear not only from Ben-Gurion’s statements, 
but also from the language used throughout the trial by Attorney General 
and chief prosecutor Gideon Hausner. Several contemporaneous observers 
have commented on that.8  
What had not been known was the extent of political interference, 
and how accommodating the prosecution had been.9 For example, Ben-
Gurion vetted Hausner’s opening speech and influenced the report of the 
historical expert Salo Baron.10 Foreign Minister Golda Meir wanted promi-
nent mentioning of the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Al-Husseini, in order to 
create a link between the Nazis and the Arab national movement.11 Several 
countries had specific wishes how the past should be presented.12 Politics, 
presumably even to the level of party politics, played a role in the selection 
of witnesses. In the mid-fifties another Holocaust-related trial, the Rudolf 
Kasztner trial, had had negative political repercussions for Ben-Gurion’s 
  
 5 Ylana N. Miller, Creating Unity Through History: The Eichmann Trial as Transition, 1 
J. MODERN JEWISH STUD. 131, 135 (2002); accord SEGEV, supra note 1, at 332. 
 6 Michael Patrick Murray, A Study in Public International Law: Comparing the Trial of 
Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem with the Trial of the Major German War Criminals V-57, n.51 
(1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University) (on file with the 
Ohio State University Depository). The courtroom provided space for 500 journalists. Given 
their financial investment, the Israeli government was disturbed by the flagging interest of 
the media after a few weeks. Id.; see also 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, STATE OF ISRAEL, THE 
TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN 1–2 (1992) (describing the decision of the trial court to allow live 
coverage of the trial). 
 7 YABLONKA, supra note 1, at 251.  
 8 See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF 
EVIL (1963).  
 9 See YABLONKA, supra note 1, at 46–120 (discussing the role of political leaders in shap-
ing prosecution strategies). The Israeli police force responsible for the investigation, Bureau 
06, resented the interference. Id. at 64, 79–87.  
 10 Baron was an eminent historian from Columbia University. YABLONKA, supra note 1, at 
102 (mentions Ben-Gurion’s insistence that the expert should refer to the poet Bialik). Ac-
cord 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 179 (obligingly, answering a question from the 
Attorney General, Baron praised a number of Jewish thinkers and leaders, including Bialik 
and Ben-Gurion); see also SEGEV, supra note 1, at 340.  
 11 YABLONKA, supra note 1, at 84–86; see also ZERTAL, supra note 4, at 98–103.  
 12 YABLONKA, supra note 1, at 74–75. Yugoslavia, for example, did not want reference to 
Croat collaboration with Nazi Germany, but only to former Minister of the Interior, Andrija 
Artukovitch. Id.  
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party. According to historian Tom Segev, the party wanted “to reassert its 
control over the heritage of the Holocaust.”13 
Records declassified after the political changes in Communist coun-
tries allow insight in their concerted efforts to utilize the Eichmann trial for 
an attack on the capitalist West, embodied by the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. The direct target was Hans Globke, who was considered Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer’s right-hand man. The aim was to implicate Globke in the 
Holocaust and make him appear a collaborator of Eichmann.14 While the 
campaign itself is well-known, newly available records of GDR authorities 
now provide more detail.15 They show widespread cooperation among poli-
ticians and secret services in various Communist countries and the utiliza-
tion of publicists and historians, some of them linked to the Eichmann tri-
al.16 The Federal Republic, in turn, launched a countercampaign to limit the 
  
 13 SEGEV, supra note 1, at 328; see also YABLONKA, supra note 1, at 115 (“Did party con-
sideration influence the selection of witnesses? The written records are rather sparse, but one 
may assume with considerable certainty that this was the case.”). For more information on 
the Kasztner trial, see generally LEORA BILSKY, TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE: ISRAELI IDENTITY 
ON TRIAL 19–82 (2004); PNINA LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM 121–44 (1997).  
 14 ERIK LOMMATZSCH, HANS GLOBKE (1898–1973): BEAMTER IM DRITTEN REICH UND 
STAATSSEKRETÄR ADENAUERS (2009). Globke’s title was “Staatssekretär im Bundeskanzler-
amt” [State Secretary at the Federal Chancellery]. In 1963, the GDR staged a show trial 
against him. Globke’s activities in the Nazi period span writing the legal commentary on the 
1935 “Nuremberg Laws” and involvement in anti-Nazi resistance. I believe that the allega-
tions about Globke’s participation in Eichmann’s crimes are false. Lommatzsch’s book pro-
vides a balanced view on Globke. Id. Ben-Gurion and his government supported Adenauer. 
See CHRISTINA GROßE, DER EICHMANN-PROZESS ZWISCHEN RECHT UND POLITIK (1995).  
 15 Records created by the GDR authorities are available in microfilm in the Archives of 
Foreign Ministry[Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts], Berlin, file numbers: MfAA LS-
A 381; MfAA A 16242; MfAA A 13.740; MfAA A 1444; MfAA A 2925. The records show 
the involvement of Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Soviet Union. How-
ever, only the tip of the iceberg has become visible; a full review of archival sources in other 
former Communist countries would be needed. The available records reflect, among other 
subjects, the reactions to Israel’s request for documents as evidence against Eichmann. Id. 
An Austrian trial observer, involved in Nazi prosecutions, reported that journalists from 
Communists countries seemed to have been under instructions from their home countries for 
what time periods to attend the trial, Wiesinger to Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv,  Austrian 
State Archives [Österreichisches Staatsarchiv], Archives of the Republic [Archiv der Repub-
lik] file number BMI GZ 20.765-2A/62 (July 12, 1961).  
 16 Letter from Helmer, Foreign Ministry of GDR, to Vesper, GDR Ambassador to Hunga-
ry Archives of Foreign Ministry [Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts], Berlin, file 
number: MfAA A 13.740 (Jan. 17, 1961) (noting that Hungarian Holocaust survivor Jenö 
Levai’s book: EICHMANN IN UNGARN (1961) had been commissioned for the Eichmann trial 
and was vetted by the Foreign Office of the GDR). Levai was a key figure. Bureau 06 con-
tacted him during trial preparations. Joseph Kermish, Yad Vashem Archives’ Contribution to 
Preparation of the Eichmann Trial, in AFTER THE EICHMANN TRIAL: YAD VASHEM BULLETIN 
43 (1962). Levai was in Jerusalem during the trial and Hausner tried to call him as a witness. 
3 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, STATE OF ISRAEL, THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN 1362–64 (1992). 
In a publication targeting Globke, an affidavit by Levai from 1961 is printed; which I find to 
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political fallout of the trial. Apart from making information about Germa-
ny’s efforts to bring Nazi perpetrators to justice publicly available, the For-
eign Minister sent a diplomatic delegation to Jerusalem, and German Justice 
authorities sent Dietrich Zeug, a prosecutor specialized in Nazi crimes. His 
reports have only recently been declassified, and we will come back to them 
in the following. 
The political aims sketched out above were completely different. Is-
rael wanted to create a full narrative of the Holocaust, suitable to the inter-
ests of the state and to Zionism. The Communist countries wanted to dele-
gitimize the West. The Federal Republic wanted to distance itself from the 
Nazi past. What they all had in common is the wish to create a politically 
usable image of the past. 
III. THE EICHMANN TRIAL IN THE NAZI PROSECUTION FRAMEWORK OF 
1961 
The Eichmann trial was not the only trial in this period dealing with 
Nazi perpetrators. Apart from the Kasztner trial in the mid-fifties in Israel, 
several European countries dealt with Nazi crimes on an ongoing basis. The 
Soviet Union launched a new series of show trials in 1961 and 1962. The 
Federal Republic of Germany was particularly active with investigations.17 
A 1958 trial concerning the Holocaust in the German-Lithuanian border 
region led to the realization that crimes committed in Eastern Europe had 
not been sufficiently investigated. This led, in turn, to the creation of the 
“Central Agency for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes” (Zentrale Stelle der 
Landesjustizverwaltungen) which was charged with systematic investiga-
tions of Nazi crimes before the statute of limitations set in.18 Its creation 
was, of course, highly contested, as a large part of the German population 
did not want a continuation of Nazi trials.19 Parts of the legal system shared 
this negative attitude. Those who chose to involve themselves in the prose-
cution of Nazi crimes did so out of moral conviction, not careerism.  
In the following, we will situate the case against Adolf Eichmann in 
the contemporaneous framework and evaluate it using the level of infor-
  
be historically untrue. REINHARD M. STRECKER, DR. HANS GLOBKE: AKTENAUSZÜGE, 
DOKUMENTE 270 (1961).   
 17 A good overview is provided by the lecture of Adalbert Rückerl, then head of Central 
Agency, in Israel to representatives of the Israel Police, Yad Vashem and Israeli media, Main 
State Archives [Hautpstaatsarchiv], Stuttgart, file number EA 4/106, Bü 90, (Sept. 8, 1969).  
 18 See generally ADALBERT RÜCKERL, DIE STRAFVERFOLGUNG VON NS- VERBRECHEN 
1945–1978 (1979) (providing an overview of the work of the Central Agency). The German 
debate over the statute of limitations for murder cannot be dealt with in this article. Suffice it 
to say, that in the end Germany decided to abolish it.  
 19 See id. 
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mation about Nazi crimes and the Holocaust available at the time.20 How to 
measure what was known? The reports by Dietrich Zeug, a specialist on 
Nazi prosecutions who was present at the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem for 
the full length of the hearing (apart from the sentencing), can serve as a 
conduit to help us measure what was known. From April to August 1961 he 
wrote twenty-nine reports to his superiors at the Central Agency and the 
prosecution office (Staatsanwaltschaft) in Frankfurt, Main.21 Zeug was also 
in contact with Fritz Bauer, the Attorney General (Generalstaatsanwalt) of 
the Province of Hessen in Frankfurt, a man very dedicated to the prosecu-
tion of Nazi crimes who had played a crucial role in the identification and 
capture of Eichmann in Argentina.22  
Zeug had joined the Central Agency in May of 1959, a few months 
after its foundation.23 His responsibilities included investigations of crimes 
committed in the District of Lublin, located in the part of occupied Poland 
called “Generalgouvernement.” The SS and Police Leader in Lublin had 
directed a major mass-murder operation, code-named “Aktion Reinhardt,” 
during which between one and a half to two million Jewish victims were 
gassed in the Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka death camps.24 Zeug’s case 
files reveal an active and determined prosecutor. After he had opened an 
investigation on Treblinka on July 9, 1959, the deputy commander of the 
camp was soon identified and then arrested on December 2, 1959.25 Zeug 
  
 20 Results of investigations or trials are not part of this analysis, only the information 
available in 1961. The Central Agency is in charge of preliminary investigations only. Af-
terwards, they hand cases over to the regional prosecution office, in whose district the main 
accused lives. These prosecutors investigate further and bring cases to court. 
 21 See generally DIETRICH ZEUG, REPORTS TO SUPERIORS [hereinafter ZEUG] (on file with 
the Main State Archives [Hauptstaatsarchiv], Stuttgart, file number EA 4/106, Bü 12). 
 22 See IRMTRUD WOJAK, EICHMANNS MEMOIREN: EIN KRITISCHER ESSAY (2001). Bauer had 
received crucial information from a German Jewish emigrant in Argentina, he traveled twice 
to Israel to pass this on to the Israeli authorities and prod them into action. Several others 
have claimed to have “hunted” Eichmann, in particular Wiesenthal. Id. See also SEGEV, 
supra note 1, at 324–26; YABLONKA, supra note 1, at 15–16. See generally SIMON 
WIESENTHAL, ICH JAGTE EICHMANN: TATSACHENBERICHT (1961). A rival Nazi “Hunter,” 
Tuviah Friedman, recounted that he had remonstrated with Wiesenthal, after the latter had 
told an audience in Montreal in 1962 that he had personally captured Eichmann. TUVIA 
FRIEDMAN, NAZI HUNTER: 60 YEARS LATER (1945–2005) 28ff (David C. Gross ed., trans. 
2006).  
 23 See PROSECUTION OFFICE [Staatsanwaltschaft], FRANKFURT TO ISRAEL MISSION, 
COLOGNE (Jan. 16, 1961) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ko-
blenz branch, file number B 141/21887) (noting that Zeug was born in 1930. He joined the 
Central Agency at the relatively young age of 29).  
 24 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (May 29, 1961); see also “AKTION REINHARDT”: DER 
VÖLKERMORD AN DEN JUDEN IM GENERALGOUVERNEMENT 1941–1944 (Bogdan Musial ed., 
2004) (providing a good overview of events).  
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was sent to Jerusalem because of his extensive knowledge of the subject 
matter of the trial.26 
A. Zeug’s Reports 
Zeug was commissioned to follow the Eichmann trial and collect as 
much information as possible that might be beneficial to German cases, not 
only for those of the Central Agency, but also of other attorneys’ offices. In 
addition, he was to strengthen relations with a specialized Israeli Police unit 
and with Yad Vashem archives, with which the German authorities were 
cooperating closely.27 He also planned to interrogate Eichmann following 
the trial. Zeug’s first impressions were very positive, and he commented on 
how well he was received by the prosecution team.28 Afterwards, his com-
ments became critical. Zeug identified that not much information presented 
by the prosecution was unfamiliar to him. In fact, the Central Agency’s 
knowledge regarding some core points of the indictment was superior.29 On 
May 10, 1961, he suggested to his superiors to return early.30 While he fol-
lowed the trial to the end, his final report confirmed his overall critical view 
of the prosecution’s presentation of evidence and manner of argumenta-
tion.31  
Zeug had, of course, neither doubted that Eichmann was a major 
Nazi perpetrator nor subscribed to the defense’s argument that Eichmann 
  
 25 See DIETRICH ZEUG, MEMO TO FILE (July 9, 1959) (on file with the German Federal 
Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B 162/3817); see also ZEUG TO 
SCHÜLE (Dec. 2, 1959) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigs-
burg branch, file number B 162/3819). 
 26 See GRÜTZNER, FEDERAL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, MEMO TO FILE (Mar. 20, 1961) (on file 
with the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Koblenz branch, file number B 
141/21887).  
 27 It is unclear why this specialized police unit had not been incorporated in Bureau 06, 
which was in charge of conducting the investigations and preparing the case against Eich-
mann. Zeug also visited other archives in Israel but found little material that would have 
assisted German investigations. See ZEUG, supra note 21 (May 2, 1961, May 7, 1961, May 
17, 1961, June 12, 1961).  
 28 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (Apr. 11, 1961). Zeug received mail from his office in Germa-
ny via Hausner. See PROSECUTION OFFICE [Staatsanwaltschaft] MUNCHEN I TO ZEUG VIA 
HAUSNER (July 10, 1961) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Lud-
wigsburg branch, file number B 162/3622).  
 29 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (Apr. 11, 1961). Archives in Communist countries, with which 
the Central Agency could not establish contact, were an exception. The Central Agency had 
also not been aware of some of the survivor witnesses and tried to call them for their own 
cases. See ZEUG, supra note 21 (June 21, 1961).  
 30 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (May 10, 1961).  
 31 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (Aug. 17, 1961). The planned interview of Eichmann did not 
take place. The Israeli authorities gave Zeug permission to speak to Eichmann, but he refused 
to be interviewed. See ZEUG, supra note 21 (Aug. 25, 1961).  
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had just been a small cog in the Nazi state’s mass-murder machinery.32 
However, Zeug’s level of knowledge allowed him to differentiate between 
founded and unfounded allegations. His criticism can be summarized as 
follows: First, the prosecution did not define Eichmann’s responsibilities 
and actions correctly. Eichmann was not the “central figure” in the “final 
solution of the Jewish question,” as he was portrayed.33 Second, the prose-
cution had not prepared its case with the thoroughness required; it had not 
evaluated all available archives and sources of information.34 This included 
a lack of outreach to the Central Agency, which would have been beneficial 
to the case.35 Third, Hausner was not interested in the historical truth, in the 
real Eichmann. Whenever the evidence did not support his preconceived 
image, Hausner used rhetorical language to conceal the holes in his case.36 
IV. WAS ZEUG’S CRITICISM JUSTIFIED? 
The trial record corroborates Zeug’s criticism that the prosecution 
would have benefited from cooperation with the Central Agency. In January 
of 1961, Zeug had interrogated a major perpetrator formerly active in Lu-
blin, Georg Michalsen. In his statement, Michalsen mentioned that Eich-
mann had been a spectator of deportations from the Warsaw ghetto in 1942. 
This damning piece of information was not known to Hausner. When he 
tried to introduce it as evidence, together with an affidavit by Zeug, the 
court refused to accept it at that late stage.37 
However, the view that German authorities could have helped the 
Israeli prosecution is at odds with commentary on the Eichmann trial. The 
tenor is that the Eichmann trial was decisive to prod the reluctant Germans 
into action, to make them finally move ahead with investigations and trials 
against Nazi criminals. This opinion was voiced already by Hannah Ar-
endt38 and has become accepted wisdom.39 It was actively supported by the 
  
 32 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (June 21, 1961).  
 33 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (May 29, 1961).  
 34 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (Apr. 21, 1961, May 29, 1961, July 28, 1961).  
 35 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (Apr. 21, 1961, Apr. 26, 1961, July 28, 1961). Zeug comment-
ed critically on mistakes and omissions by the German legal authorities as well. For instance, 
collaborators of Eichmann, who had been mentioned in the trial, had not been investigated 
with the required rigor. See ZEUG, supra note 21 (Apr. 27, 1961, May 17, 1961). 
 36 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (July 15, 1961, July 28, 1961).   
 37 3 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 1316, 1318–19; see also INTERROGATION OF 
GEORG MICHALSEN (Jan. 24–25, 1961) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bun-
desarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B 162/2062). Eichmann denied the incident 
during cross-examination. 4 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, STATE OF ISRAEL, THE TRIAL OF ADOLF 
EICHMANN 1714–15 (1992). Zeug does not refer to this incident in his reports.  
 38 See ARENDT, supra note 8, at 11–16. Robinson contradicts this view. See ROBINSON, 
supra note 2, at 139–41. This is uncharacteristic, as Robinson usually supports the prosecu-
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Israeli government40 and by members of the prosecution team.41 The media 
reinforced it further. Every arrest that was made in 1961 was automatically 
connected to Eichmann.42 Specialized literature on Nazi trials, on the other 
hand, shows that these connections do not exist.43 
The activities and level of knowledge of the Central Agency in 
1961 are reflected in their internal case list for the 1961 period.44 Investiga-
tions on the major crimes of the Holocaust in Poland and the Soviet Union, 
such as deaths camps, concentration camps, ghettos and mobile killing 
  
tion’s viewpoint. However, it fits into the overall purpose of his book, which is to refute 
everything Arendt wrote. See id. at viii.  
 39 See Eichmann-Prozeß, in 1 ENZYKLOPÄDIE DES HOLOCAUST (Israel Gutman ed., 1995) 
(exhibiting acceptance of this view in the Holocaust encyclopedia).  
 40 The press office of the Israeli government released a statistical report, dated August 13, 
1961. This survey—using data received through requests for legal assistance—contains a 
comparison between the measures taken throughout the world against Nazi war criminals in 
the two years before the apprehension of Adolf Eichmann and during the year afterwards. 
See CENTRAL AGENCY TO MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG (Nov. 10, 1961) 
(on file with the Main State Archives [Hauptstaatsarchiv], Stuttgart, Germany, file number 
EA 4/106, Bü 7).  
 41 See GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 451–52, 466–68 (1966). With his usual 
hyperbole, Hausner adds: “The trial, which brought the true facts to life, came as a shock just 
when the ‘research’ institutes had half-succeeded in clipping the devil’s nails, cropping his 
horns and camouflaging his tail. So it was from Jerusalem that the Germans were reminded . 
. . .” Id. at 467; see also Gabriel Bach, Genocide (Holocaust) Trials in Israel, in THE 
NUREMBERG TRIALS: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SINCE 1945, at 216, 221 (Herbert R. 
Reginbogin & Christoph J.M. Safferling eds., 2006).  
 42 An Austrian war crimes investigator complained that the Israeli media reports on this 
issue were very biased. See WIESINGER REPORT (Jan. 9, 1962) (on file with the Austrian State 
Archives [Österreichisches Staatsarchiv], Archives of the Republic [Archiv der Republik], 
file number BMI GZ 20.765-2A/62); see also ZENTRALE RECHTSSCHUTZSTELLE, FOREIGN 
MINISTRY,  TO FEDERAL MINISTER OF JUSTICE (Apr. 29, 1961) (on file with the German Fed-
eral Archives [Bundesarchiv], Koblenz branch, file number B 305/960 Bd. 1); REPORT OF 
TRIAL OBSERVER [BERICHT BEOBACHTER] (May 23, 1961) (on file with the German Federal 
Archives [Bundesarchiv], Koblenz branch, file number B 83/435); DR. RAAB, MEMO TO FILE 
[Aufzeichnung] (Mar. 2, 1961) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], 
Koblenz branch, file number B 83/743).  
 43 For example, the arrest of Richard Baer, the last commander of Auschwitz, was not 
linked to the Eichmann trial. See REBECCA WITTMAN, BEYOND JUSTICE: THE AUSCHWITZ 
TRIAL 93 (2005).  
 44 See OVERVIEW OF CASES CONCERNING NAZI CRIMES [ÜBERSICHT ÜBER VERFAHREN 
WEGEN NS-GEWALTVERBRECHEN] (Dec. 1, 1961) (on file with the German Federal Archives 
[Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B162/82). The registration number of 
each case indicates the year it was started. Investigations commenced between 1958 and 
1960 cannot have been caused by the Eichmann trial; see also CENTRAL AGENCY, CASE 
OVERVIEW [ÜBERSICHT] OF INVESTIGATIONS OF NAZI CRIMES, (on file with the Main State 
Archives [Hauptstaatsarchiv], Stuttgart, file number EA 4/106 Bü 10) (presenting an over-
view as of Dec. 1, 1960). 
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units, were commenced in 1958-1960.45 In comparison, fewer investigations 
concerning deportations of the Jewish population from Western European 
countries to death camps in the East are listed.46 The prosecution office in 
Frankfurt dealt with Eichmann and his unit.47 Eichmann’s office was part of 
the “Reichssicherheitshauptamt” (RSHA) in Berlin; several members of that 
institution had been under investigation since the fifties.48  
A review of the files shows no influence by the Eichmann trial.49 
Investigations followed their own dynamics, based on the discovery of new 
sources of information and previous investigations.50 The following se-
quence of events can be considered typical: at the beginning of an investiga-
tion, for example those conducted by Zeug on “Aktion Reinhardt,” the first 
pieces of information, mostly survivor accounts compiled in the immediate 
post-war period in Poland, were supplied by Yad Vashem archives in Israel. 
The German investigators used these accounts to search for perpetrator-
specific documents in German archives, which would provide information 
on the chain of command and organizational structures. Other archives, in 
Germany or other countries, provided the historical context. 
The investigators also searched for the perpetrators. When inter-
viewed, perpetrators often openly admitted that they participated in mass 
murder, for instance by gassing in death camps. They only denied that they 
had committed individual acts of cruelty. For proving the latter, survivor 
witnesses were crucial. German investigators located survivors with the 
help of Jewish organizations and a special detachment of the Israeli Police.51 
The Central Agency worked closely with the relevant institutions in Israel 
  
 45 See OVERVIEW OF CASES CONCERNING NAZI CRIMES, supra note 44, at 2, 24–62.  
 46 Id. at 64–69 (listing investigations related to Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia and Holland). 
Less work had been done on Belgium, France, Italy and Serbia. Id. 
 47 Id. at 76–77. 
 48 Id. at 108–09. 
 49 This assessment is based on the review of the following investigation files, all on file 
with the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch. They can be locat-
ed via the following file numbers B 162/951–953, 958, 1695–1702, 2062, 2206, 2209–2210, 
2324–2326, 2638, 2641–2656, 2660–2661, 2876–2882, 2958–2959, 3164–3171, 3177, 
3243–3249, 3275–3276, 3301, 3373–3376, 3407–3420, 3422, 3622–3624, 3817–3822, 3819, 
4425–4429, 4632, 4940, 4973–4976, 4632, 5018–5023, 5055, 5104, 5350–5252, 5610, 
14193.  
 50 According to the German system, investigations were conducted by the police under the 
direction of prosecutors.  See generally Markus Dirk Dubber, The Promise of German Crim-
inal Law: A Science of Crime and Punishment, 6 GER. L. J. 1049, 1049 (2005) (presenting an 
overview of the German criminal justice system). 
 51 On the reasons for setting up the unit see SCHÜLE, AT CENTRAL AGENCY, TO SHINNAR, 
AT ISRAEL MISSION (Jan. 21, 1960), SCHÜLE TO MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF BADEN 
WÜRTTEMBERG (Jan. 29, 1960), and LIFF, ISRAEL POLICE, TO SCHÜLE (May 3, 1961) (on file 
with the Central Agency [Zentrale Stelle] General Files [Generalakten] file number III-32, 
Bd. 1). 
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and had had access to much of the information and many of the witnesses, 
later used in the Eichmann trial. However, the Central Agency drew on a 
wider range of sources of information than used by the Eichmann prosecu-
tion.52  
V. THE CRIMES EICHMANN COMMITTED AND THOSE HE DID NOT COMMIT 
In his reports, Zeug identified the major problem of the Eichmann 
trial: the prosecution pursued two incompatible goals. On the one hand, the 
prosecution attempted to present a full picture of the Holocaust. On the oth-
er hand, it attempted to bring to justice Adolf Eichmann, who had had nar-
rower responsibilities.53 The political aim connected with the trial was clear: 
to create a politically usable image of past history. To achieve this aim in 
the context of a criminal trial, Hausner had to exaggerate the crimes of the 
real Eichmann to the point that they encompassed all the crimes of the Hol-
ocaust. For example, wanting to cover the whole sequence of events from 
1933 to 1945, Hausner called witnesses to testify concerning events that had 
occurred in early 1933 at which time Eichmann had not even moved from 
Austria to Germany.54 Hausner had to fill the mold of the “greatest war 
criminal” pre-set by Ben-Gurion. 
Hausner’s opening address reveals the contours of the imagined 
Eichmann. “There was only one man who had been concerned almost en-
tirely with the Jews, whose business had been their destruction. . . .” - 
Eichmann.55 Hausner presented Eichmann as the “executive arm for the 
extermination of the Jewish people,”56 whose word “put gas chambers into 
action.”57 
He lorded it over the ghettos and extermination centres; his position in the 
RSHA was unique. He could pass over the heads of his superiors and deal 
directly with Himmler . . . .
58
 
The Accused, as head of the Gestapo Department for Jewish Affairs, as 
Special Commissioner for the extermination of the Jews, bears direct re-
  
 52 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (Apr. 21, 1961, Apr. 26, 1961). 
 53 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (May 29, 1961). “[D]ass der Prozess zwei nicht miteinander 
vereinbare Zwecke verfolgt, nämlich einmal die Aburteilung des Angeklagten Eichmann—
der nur in einen Teil der Geschehnisse eingeschaltet war—und zum andern eine historische 
Darstellung aller Geschehnisse.” [That the trial had two incompatible aims, which are, to 
have the accused, Eichmann—who was involved in only some of the events—brought to 
justice, and, at the same time, give an historical overview of all events.] 
 54 See 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 210–32 (presenting the testimony of Benno 
Cohn, who testified about events in 1933). 
 55 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 63. 
 56 Id. at 62. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 73. 
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sponsibility as the initiator and implementer of this blood bath. We shall 
show proof of his initiative and his control over the ghettos, his responsi-
bility and his role in the setting-up and the operation of the extermination 
camps, and the responsibility for the destruction of Polish Jewry.
59
  
Not content with having created this larger-than-life monster, Haus-
ner added in his oral summary that Eichmann had been “more extreme even 
than that evil man Hitler himself.”60 Though without the hyperbole, the in-
dictment reflects the very broad charges.61 
These allegations bear no resemblance to the position the real 
Eichmann held. Even Heinrich Himmler, Head of SS and German police, 
would not have fit into the image Hausner had created, as even he was not 
responsible for all components of the Holocaust. Eichmann had joined the 
SD, a branch of the Security Police in 1934. He headed organizations for the 
forced emigration of Jews and expropriation of their property set up in 1938 
and 1939 in Vienna, Berlin and Prague. His section was in charge of depor-
tations of various population groups, most importantly, the deportation of 
Jews, mainly from Western European countries, to death camps in the East. 
In 1944, he went with most of his staff to Hungary to organize the deporta-
tion of the last surviving Jewish community in Nazi occupied Europe. 
Eichmann was a major perpetrator. He held an important position. He was 
involved in many different crimes. He had shown zeal and initiative in his 
activities. But he was not the central figure in the Holocaust.62 In the chain 
of command his position was four levels below Himmler.63 Zeug rightly 
pointed out that there had been 20 to 30 perpetrators of the same importance 
than Eichmann.64 Eichmann had not committed a good part of the crimes 
Hausner alleged. We will look at three of the most egregious examples. 
  
 59 Id. at 89. 
 60 5 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, STATE OF ISRAEL, THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN 2016 (1994). 
 61 See 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 3–8 (reading of the indictment). 
 62 One reason Eichmann gained such prominence is that because of his activities in Hun-
gary and in forced emigration, he was in personal contact with Jewish leaders. Many of them 
survived. Eichmann’s superior, Heinrich Müller, the head of the Gestapo, was little known 
publicly. 
 63 According to Himmler’s official diary for 1941–42, he met Eichmann once, together 
with Eichmann’s superior, Heinrich Müller, on August 11, 1941. HEINRICH HIMMLER, DER 
DIENSTKALENDER HEINRICH HIMMLERS 1941/42, 513 (Peter Witte et al. eds., 1999). This 
corroborates Eichmann’s own statement to the police. 7 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, STATE OF 
ISRAEL, THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN 263(1995). 
 64 ZEUG, supra note 21 (May 29, 1961).  Zeug also expressed the opinion that Eichmann 
would have to be acquitted for one-third of the crimes of the Holocaust. See ZEUG, supra 
note 21 (June 30, 1961, Aug. 17, 1961). Historians now recognize that Eichmann’s responsi-
bility was not as Hausner had alleged. See DAVID CESARANI, EICHMANN: HIS LIFE AND 
CRIMES (2005) (discussing the various stages of Eichmann’s career). 
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A. “Aktion Reinhardt” 
Zeug had concentrated on the “Aktion Reinhardt” immediately af-
ter he joined the Central Agency.65 The operation was run by the SS and 
Police Leader Lublin, Odilo Globocnik, who commanded three death camps 
in Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka, and organized deportations from ghettos 
to camps and on-the-spot mass shootings throughout his district. Zeug and 
his investigators had managed to reconstruct the complex chain of com-
mand leading to “Aktion Reinhardt.” Globocnik had been commissioned 
directly by Himmler, and the staff of the death camps had been assigned by 
Hitler’s Chancellery (Kanzlei des Führers).66 The link was the so-called 
“Euthanasia” program, the mass gassing of disabled people in Germany, 
which was run by the Chancellery and in which the personnel of the death 
camps had been previously active. As hardly any documentation on the top-
secret “Aktion Reinhardt” has survived, the German investigators had to 
piece the responsibilities together by using promotion records and similar 
documents from SS-personnel files. Eichmann was not part of this chain of 
command (though he was responsible for deportations from Western Europe 
to “Aktion Reinhardt” camps).67 He was, as mentioned by Zeug, not respon-
sible for most of the crimes committed within the “Generalgouverne-
ment.”68 
Count 1 of the indictment included the “Aktion Reinhardt” camps in 
the allegation that the accused, together with others, had “caused the death 
of millions of Jews” and “perpetrated the extermination of Jews” at death 
  
 65 ZEUG, INVESTIGATION REPORT ON SSPF LUBLIN, German federal Archives [Bun-
desarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B 162/1695 (Mar. 12, 1960). See generally 
YITZHAK ARAD, BELZEC, SOBIBOR, TREBLINKA: THE OPERATION REINHARD DEATH CAMPS 
(1987). 
 66 See Peter R. Black, Rehearsal for “Reinhard”?: Odilo Globocnik and the Lublin 
Selbstschutz, 25 CENT. EUR. HISTORY 204, 207 (1992) (stating that Globoncnik had been 
commissioned directly by Himmler); HENRY FRIEDLÄNDER, THE ORIGINS OF NAZI GENOCIDE: 
FROM EUTHANASIA TO THE FINAL SOLUTION 284–302 (1995) (on the role of Hitler’s Chancel-
lery). 
 67 Not all deportations to death camps, however, were organized by Eichmann’s section, 
IVB4. Eichmann himself admitted already in his police interrogation that he had visited 
Lublin and liaised with Globocnik. 7 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 63, at 170–73, 179–
80, 229–31, 239–40. Recently discovered documents throw a light on the extent of these 
communications. See Stephen Tyas, Der britische Nachrichtendienst. Entschlüsselte Funk-
meldungen aus dem Generalgouvernement, in “AKTION REINHARDT”: DER VÖLKERMORD AN 
DEN JUDEN IM GENERALGOUVERNEMENT 1941–1944 (Bogdan Musial ed., 2004); ZEUG, FINAL 
REPORT ON TREBLINKA(Nov. 26, 1959) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bun-
desarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B162/3819); ZEUG, FINAL REPORT ON BELZEC, 
German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B162/3167 
(Feb. 16, 1960); ZEUG, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON SOBIBOR (Apr. 11, 1960) (on file with the 
German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B162/4426). 
 68 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (May 29, 1961, June 21, 1961). 
File: Birn 2 Created on:  1/28/2012 9:04:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:25:00 PM 
456 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:443 
camps in Auschwitz, Chelmno, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, [and] Maj-
danek.”69 In Count 7, “Aktion Reinhardt” is referred to under the heading 
“Plunder of Jewish property in Eastern Europe.”70 Zeug, in his first report, 
mentioned that he found a mistake in Count 7: a non-existing Security Po-
lice entity was referred to as being in charge instead of the SS-Police Leader 
Lublin.71 In his opening address, a few days later, Hausner corrected the 
mistake.72 Hausner’s lack of understanding of the unusual chain of com-
mand73 is apparent in his cross-examination of Eichmann. Hausner claimed 
that the “Aktion Reinhardt” camps had been under the RSHA, which, in 
Hausner’s simplified concept, would have meant that Eichmann was re-
sponsible.74 Eichmann rejected these false assumptions, and Hausner did not 
get any admissions on this point from him.75 Undeterred, Hausner conclud-
ed in his summing-up: “But all these are idle excuses. In actual fact, Eich-
mann dealt with the Jews of the Generalgouvernement in exactly the same 
way in which he dealt with the Jews of occupied Europe . . . .”76  
In response to pointed questions from the bench, however, Hausner 
had to admit that he had no direct proof. The following exchange took 
place:  
  
 69 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 3. Auschwitz, Chelmno and Majdanek were 
under the administration of different Nazi organizations, but not under the RSHA. Eich-
mann’s unit was in charge of deportations to some of them, in particular to Auschwitz. 
 70 Id. at 5–6. The reference to plunder is due to the fact that one of the few remaining 
documents is Globocnik’s report on the economical results of “Aktion Reinhardt,” that is, the 
plunder of the possessions of the murdered victims. This has been misleading scholars for 
quite some time. 
 71 See  ZEUG, supra note 21 (Apr. 4, 1961). 
 72 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 90. 
 73 Hausner’s knowledge was deficient in respect of witnesses as well. Because he was 
unaware of the whereabouts of the sole known survivor of Belzec, Hausner introduced the 
post-war report of an observer, a well-known, but problematic document. 3 MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 1221. Zeug had located the survivor in question and he had testi-
fied in Munich in 1960. ZEUG TO PROSECUTION OFFICE [Staatsanwaltschaft], MÜNCHEN I, 
(Mar. 7, 1960) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg 
branch, file number B 162/3167). 
 74 Hausner assumed, erroneously, that, as the SS organization responsible for concentra-
tion camps (WVHA) was not in charge, this had to mean that it was the RSHA, 4 MINISTRY 
OF JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 1727; 5 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 2009. As part of 
his evidence, Hausner submitted a Nuremberg affidavit by Oswald Pohl, head of the WVHA, 
3 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 1341–42. Pohl, who was sentenced to death in one 
of the Nuremberg successor trials, could hardly have been considered a trustworthy witness 
on the matter of responsibilities. Throughout the trial, Hausner argued that whenever the 
RSHA was involved, Eichmann was involved. Eichmann was, however, head of one sub-
section, albeit an important one in the context of the Holocaust. 
 75 4 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 1635, 1727–29.  
 76 5 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 1992.  
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Presiding Judge: Mr. Hausner, do we have any specific proof to the effect 
that he was involved in what was called the “Aktion Reinhard”?  
Attorney General: Specific, Your Honour? That is to say, about Eich-
mann and the Aktion Reinhard?  
Presiding Judge: Yes.  
Attorney General: Direct proof—does Your Honour mean?  
Presiding Judge: Yes.  
Attorney General: No, there is none. But there is a construction which, in 
my opinion, stands the tests of logic and reality.
77
 
B. Sonderkommmando 1005 
Another particularly gruesome group of crimes described by survi-
vor witnesses in heart-rending detail during the trial was the exhumation of 
corpses from mass graves and burning of the remains to destroy the evi-
dence. The judgment referred to these events as “visions of hell which were 
amongst the most horrifying parts of all the evidence . . . .”78 The unit in 
charge, commanded by Paul Blobel, had the code-name “Sonderkommando 
1005.” Jewish prisoners were forced to do the work and routinely killed 
before the unit moved on. While one of the few survivors was on the stand, 
Eichmann’s defense lawyer raised objections, not to contest the facts, but 
because Eichmann had nothing to do with them. Hausner claimed other-
wise: “With regard to the covering up of the traces, our point is that the Ac-
cused was the superior of Blobel . . . .”79 In this view, Hausner was support-
ed by a leading researcher from Yad Vashem.80 
Here, again, the findings of the Central Agency could have been of 
assistance to the prosecution. Already in 1960, during an investigation of a 
  
 77 Id. In its judgment, the district court correctly referred to the fact that Eichmann’s unit 
sent victims to these camps. See id. at 2160. In addition, the court assumed, based on a rather 
complicated piece of evidence, that further links to Eichmann existed. See id. at 2160–62. 
 78 Id. at 2164.  
 79 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 366. 
 80 According to Rachel Auerbach, head of the Collection of Testimony Department at Yad 
Vashem, these special commands “were led by one of Eichmann’s helpers, SS Standarten-
fuehrer Blobel. I have been working for years on the documentation of unit No 1005 . . . .” 
Rachel Auerbach, Witnesses and Testimony in the Eichmann Trial, 11 YAD VASHEM 
BULLETIN 48 (1962). As additional evidence Hausner used two post-war affidavits, one by 
the commander of Auschwitz, the other by a close collaborator of Eichmann. Both had rea-
sons to blame Eichmann, both had been executed. On this point, again, Hausner’s reasoning 
was surprisingly simplistic. The Nazis wanted to destroy all Jews, the man in charge was 
Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the RSHA, who “for his part, appointed the Accused . . . . 
Consequently, the Prosecution maintains that everything that was done as a result of that 
decision and under that control for the extermination of the Jews is relevant. The Accused 
will be held responsible for all this . . . .” 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 366. This 
type of reasoning would leave out a number of major perpetrators. 
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sub-unit of “Sonderkommando 1005,” the chain of command had been es-
tablished. Blobel’s superior was the head of Section IV of the RSHA, Hein-
rich Müller. Locally, Security Police offices supplied manpower for the 
unit. (Eichmann admitted that Blobel’s unit was housed in the same build-
ing when in Berlin.) Several members of the subunit, called “Teilkommando 
Cholm,” had been interrogated and had made substantial admissions about 
their way of operating.81 One of Hausner’s witnesses, Joseph Reznik, had 
been forced to work in this subunit.82 Before the Eichmann trial, the Israel 
Police had located and questioned Reznik (as well as other survivors of the 
same unit) on behalf of the German authorities.83 The unit’s commander, 
whom Reznik mentioned in his testimony, had been identified in March of 
1960.84  
The district court displayed better judgment by rejecting Hausner’s 
allegation: “We find that the evidence is not sufficient to place the responsi-
bility for the activities of Blobel’s unit on the Accused.”85 In fact, as the 
court noted, Blobel had stated in Nuremberg that he was subordinate to 
Müller. 
C. Mobile Killing Units (Einsatzgruppen) 
Hausner contended that the Einsatzgruppen in the Soviet Union had 
“operated in collaboration with the Accused . . . .”86 This was a grave alle-
gation but also unfounded. Mobile killing units (Einsatzgruppen and at the 
lower level Einsatzkommandos) had moved into the Soviet Union on the 
  
 81 ZEUG, FINAL REPORT ON “TEILKOMMANDO CHOLM” (Apr. 2, 1960) (on file with the 
German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B 162/ 4973). 
Statements by former unit members taken in November 1960 are on file with the German 
Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B 162/4975. Regarding 
the chain of command, see KDS LEMBERG TO HSSPF KRAKAU (May 28, 1944) (on file with 
the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B 
162/4973). Eichmann comments on his links to “Sonderkommando 1005,” which included 
organizing supplies in, 7 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 63, at 263–65; 4 MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 1556–57.  
 82 See 3 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 1159–62 (1992) (describing how Joseph 
Reznik was forced to exhume corpses from mass graves). 
 83 The statements had been forwarded to Germany on July 27, 1960. LANDSBERG TO LIFF 
(Aug. 14, 1961) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg 
branch, file number B 162/4676). 
 84 ZEUG TO CRIMINAL POLICE [Landeskriminalamt], NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN (Mar. 16, 
1960); ZEUG TO WEIDA (Mar. 18, 1960) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bun-
desarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B 162/4873). The commander of the sub-unit, 
Rohlfing, was at this time still in active police service. Id. 
 85 5 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 2164. Some historians nevertheless still as-
sume closer links. See YAACOV LOZOWICK, HITLER’S BUREAUCRATS, THE NAZI SECURITY 
POLICE AND THE BANALITY OF EVIL 137 (Haim Watzman trans.) (2002). 
 86 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 3 (count 1 of Eichmann’s indictment).    
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heels of the invading German armed forces and conducted large-scale 
shooting operations. Victims came from the civilian population, in particu-
lar the Jewish population.87 Case 9 of the Nuremberg successor trials had 
dealt with the activities of the Einsatzgruppen. The reports of these units, in 
which a mounting death count was painstakingly listed, formed damning 
evidence against those accused in Case 9. A high number of death sentences 
were handed out.88 
The indictment against the leader of Einsatzkommando 8, by the 
Public Prosecution’s Office in München, dated April 19, 1960, (before 
Eichmann was even kidnapped) described the setting up and chain of com-
mand correctly, from the head of the RSHA to the leaders of Einsatzgrup-
pen, and then down to the commanders of various Einsatzkommandos. 
Eichmann’s section, Referat IVB4, did not play a role.89 As mentioned 
above, the Central Agency had opened investigations against all of these 
units, some of them as early as 1958, which were parceled out to individual 
prosecutors’ offices.90 From the Eichmann trial record it appears that Haus-
ner erroneously assumed that every mobile killing unit was an Einsatzkom-
mando, while the Central Agency’s investigations had discovered that po-
lice units had a large share in the mass shootings in the Soviet Union. These 
police units were part of another branch of Police, called Order Police, and 
were not subordinate to the RSHA and therefore not even institutionally 
linked to Eichmann.91 
Zeug, unsurprisingly, commented rather negatively on this part of 
the trial.92 Hausner based his case mainly on the testimony of one witness, 
Michael Musmanno, who had served as judge in Case 9 in Nuremberg. 
Against the objections of defense counsel Robert Servatius that Musmanno 
  
 87 See generally HELMUT KRAUSNICK & HANS HANS-HEINRICH WILHELM, DIE TRUPPE DES 
WELTANSCHAUUNGSKRIEGES: DIE EINSATZGRUPPEN DER SICHERHEITSPOLIZEI UND DES SD 
1938–1942 (1981) (offering the best overview of the mobile killing units).   
 88 See generally 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, NUREMBERG, OCT. 1946-APR. 1949 
(1949); HILARY EARL, THE NUREMBERG SS-EINSATZGRUPPEN TRIAL, 1945–1958: ATROCITY, 
LAW, AND HISTORY (2009). 
 89 Higher Regional Court, Prosecution Office [Staatsanwaltschaft beim Landgericht] 
München I, Indictment [Anklage] against Otto Bradfisch et al. (April 19, 1960) (on file with 
the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B 
162/3177). Bradfisch had been under arrest since 1958.  
 90 CASE OVERVIEW OF INVESTIGATIONS OF NAZI CRIMES, supra note 44, at 24–49. 
 91 The role played by Order Police Battalions was discovered by prosecutors and investi-
gators, not historians. The latter started to deal with the subject comparatively late. The in-
fluential book by Browning, for example, was only published in 1992. See CHRISTOPHER R. 
BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTALION 101 AND THE FINAL SOLUTION IN 
POLAND (1992).  
 92 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (May 29, 1961). 
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could only present hearsay and that the record of Case 9 should be consulted 
and not the judge called to bear witness, Musmanno was allowed to testi-
fy.93  
This episode is among the most unedifying of the Eichmann trial. 
Hausner, eager to get Musmanno accepted as a witness, maintained that he 
did not know where the records of Case 9 could be found, while defense 
counsel provided the exact location.94 Musmanno, while trying to support 
the prosecution, had to admit that Eichmann was not mentioned in his ver-
dict. His testimony also revealed that he had been taken in by wild stories 
circulating in Nuremberg prison while interviewing people for a report, later 
a book, on the death of Hitler.95 He recounted in all seriousness that high-
ranking Nazis like Hermann Göring, Joachim von Ribbentrop and Ernst 
Kaltenbrunner had all told him that Eichmann had been “all powerful on the 
question of the extermination of the Jews,” that Eichmann “was the man 
who was to determine in what order, in what countries the Jews were to 
die,” and indeed “that Eichmann influenced Hitler.”96 Kaltenbrunner, as 
head of the RSHA and therefore Eichmann’s superior three levels up, had 
every reason to put the blame on one of his subordinates. Of course, the 
same motives can be implied for the others.97 When defense counsel pointed 
this out in cross-examination, Musmanno insisted that he nevertheless be-
lieved them. Musmanno had to admit, though, that he had not mentioned 
Eichmann in his book as well.98 
  
 93 See 2 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, STATE OF ISRAEL, THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN 704–29 
(1992) (containing the attorney general’s request to call Musmanno as a witness and his 
testimony). 
 94 See id. at 706–09, 715–17. Not only defense counsel and Zeug, but also the German 
diplomatic observer, knew in which archives these records were kept. See KRONECK TO 
FOREIGN MINISTRY (May 15, 1961) (on file with the Archives of Foreign Ministry [Politisch-
es Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts], Berlin, file number B 83/435). 
 95 See generally Ruth Bettina Birn, Criminals as Manipulative Witnesses: A Case Study of 
SS General von dem Bach-Zelewski, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 441 (2011) (on fabrication of 
evidence in Nuremberg jail). 
 96 See 2 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 710 (reference to Kaltenbrunner); id. at 
720–21 (quoting Musmanno testimony).  
 97 All three were sentenced to death at IMT and executed. In addition, Musmanno relied 
heavily on Walter Schellenberg, defendant in Case 11, a highly unreliable source. See 2 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 726–27 (under cross-examination Musmanno stated 
that the judges in Case 11 rejected some of Schellenberg’s statements).  
 98 See 2 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 720–29. Earl quotes a passage from the 
transcript of Case 9, where Musmanno reprimanded a defendant because he complained that 
he was beaten during interrogations, adding that a few blows could not have done harm to 
such a “big, strapping fellow . . . .” See EARL, supra note 88, at 245–46. Landsman mentions 
that Musmanno had already “acquired a reputation for inventing the statements he attributed 
to others” in the Sacco and Vanzetti case. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, CRIMES OF THE HOLOCAUST: 
THE LAW CONFRONTS HARD CASES 81 (Bert B. Lockwood ed., 2005). See generally MICHAEL 
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Despite these damaging admissions in cross-examination, Hausner 
repeated most of what Musmanno had said in his summing up.99 Yet again, 
the judges of the district court, while seeing some links between Eichmann 
and the “Operations Units,” did not accept most of Musmanno’s testimo-
ny.100 
Observers saw this part of the trial differently. Zeug, the prosecutor, 
knew what the real facts were and that Musmanno could contribute only 
second-hand information.101 The historian Wolfgang Scheffler considered 
Musmanno’s testimony factually extremely weak.102 Quite different was the 
view of Haim Gouri, a trial observer, whose diary-style report FACING THE 
GLASS BOOTH became very popular in Israel. He saw the arguments of the 
defense against the admission of hearsay as a desperate attempt to fend off a 
crucial witness. Gouri left the hearing with the (incorrect) beliefs that, as 
maintained by Musmanno, the “staff of Einsatzgruppen was mostly ap-
pointed by Himmler according to Eichmann’s recommendations,” and 
“Eichmann’s friends commanded all these units.”103  
VI. CRITICISM AND APPLAUSE 
A. Legal Considerations 
Initial criticism of the Eichmann trial was aimed at legal problems. 
Eichmann had been brought to trial in Jerusalem by extra-legal means, that 
is, by kidnapping.104 The 1950 Israeli law under which Eichmann was tried 
and sentenced was questioned because it was retroactive—the state of Israel 
had not existed when the crimes were committed—and because it violated 
the territoriality principle. While the law used concepts from the genocide 
convention and the Nuremberg charter, reference to “all humanity” as vic-
  
A. MUSMANNO, TEN DAYS TO DIE (1950) (presenting a sensationalist account typical for the 
fifties). 
 99 Hausner quoted Schellenberg’s statement “that Eichmann was in control of the 
Einsatzgruppen in everything related to the extermination of the Jews . . . .” 5 MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 2003–04. 
100 See id. at 2146–48, 2160, 2173. The District Court accepted evidence that Eichmann 
had deported people to areas where Einsatzgruppen operated and that he had received their 
reports but did not accept Musmanno’s testimony of Schellenberg’s statements. 
101 See ZEUG, supra note 21, (May 29, 1961). 
102 SCHEFFLER TO RAAB, AT FOREIGN MINISTRY (June 5, 1961) (on file with the German 
Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Koblenz branch, file number B 305/965). 
103 See Haim Gouri, Facing the Glass Booth: The Jerusalem Trial of Adolf Eichmann 62–
65 (Michael Swirsky trans., 2004). 
104 The problem was settled diplomatically between Israel and Argentina. See CESARANI, 
supra note 64, at 238–39 (stating that the abduction triggered issues with Argentina’s right to 
sovereignty and Israel’s violation of international law). 
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tims was replaced with “the Jewish people.”105 Some critics, like Telford 
Taylor, proposed that Eichmann be tried by an international court.106 One 
group of commentators defended both kidnapping and trial with reference to 
the “uniqueness” of the Holocaust.107 Others saw this as a dangerous prece-
dent, a concept that did not serve “the rule of law as a basic structure for 
minimum world order” and that could, ultimately, put Israel above the 
law.108  
Aside from these general debates, several critics considered it prob-
lematic that the influence of the Israeli state was so visible. Judges, both at 
the District Court and the Supreme Court level, had previously voiced 
strong, negative opinions of Eichmann during the Kasztner trial and appeal, 
but they had not recused themselves.109 Communication lines used by de-
fense and foreign observers may have been intercepted by the Israeli author-
ities.110 The defense did not enjoy equality of arms with the prosecution, 
  
105 See SEGEV, supra note 1, at 334–36 (stating that the wording of the law seemed to ren-
der crimes against the Jewish people a greater offense than crimes against humanity).  
106 See Teldford Taylor, Large Questions in the Eichmann Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1961, 
at SM11. 
107 Golda Meir had defended Eichmann’s kidnapping on the basis of “uniqueness.” See 
J.E.S. Fawcett, The Eichmann Case, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 181, 183–84, 187–92 (1962); see 
also PETER PAPADATOS, THE EICHMANN TRIAL 53–56 (1964); J. Lador-Lederer, The Eich-
mann Case Revisited, in 14 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 54, 77–78 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1984). 
See generally Anita Shapira, The Eichmann Trial: Changing Perspective, in AFTER 
EICHMANN: COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND THE HOLOCAUST SINCE 1961 (David Cesarani ed., 
2005). Another argument used to defend the trial—ultimately by the Supreme Court—was 
that Israel was the “forum conveniens” because survivor witnesses and original documents 
were primarily housed in Israel. This is true for witnesses, but not for documents. As Zeug 
remarked, none of the original archival holdings were housed in Israel. See ZEUG, supra note 
21 (Apr. 26, 1961). 
108 See Murray, supra note 6, at III-6, VI-9; see also ROBERT K. WOETZEL, THE 
NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH A POSTLUDE ON THE EICHMANN CASE 251, 
258, 265–67 (2d ed. 1962); YOSAL ROGAT, THE EICHMANN TRIAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 
(1961).  
109 Judge Halevy referred to Eichmann as “the devil” in his decision on Kasztner. He re-
mained on the bench of the District Court, though not as presiding judge. See SEGEV, supra 
note 1, at 283, 342–32; see also YABLONKA, supra note 1, at 130–33. The Supreme Court in 
the Kasztner appeal also referred to Eichmann. See LAHAV, supra note 13, at 133–41, 157–
58. 
110 The strongest indication comes from Hausner himself, who took the German diplomatic 
observer, von Preusschen, to task over criticism Preusschen voiced in one of his confidential-
ly transmitted reports to the German Foreign Office. See ZENTRAL RECHTSSCHUTZSTELLE, 
NOTE TO FILE [Aufzeichnung)] (July 2, 1962) (with undated report by Preusschen attached) 
(on file with Archives of Foreign Ministry [Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts], Ber-
lin, file number B 110/211); see also CHRISTINA GROßE, DER EICHMANN-PROZEß ZWISCHEN 
RECHT UND POLITIK 163–64 (1995); YABLONKA, supra note 1, at 129–30 (quoting Dieter 
Wechtenbruch, junior defense counsel, whom she interviewed); Christian Gerlach, The 
Eichmann Interrogation in Holocaust Historiography, 15 HOLOCAUST & GENOCIDE STUD. 
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both in respect to resources and local standing.111 Hausner was both lead 
prosecutor and Attorney General. He used his political position to his ad-
vantage. The most disturbing manifestation was his preventing the defense 
from scrutinizing prosecution evidence.  
Apart from documents and witnesses, Hausner relied heavily on af-
fidavits produced in the post-war period, mainly in Nuremberg. Hausner’s 
main selection criteria seem to have been that the affiant incriminated 
Eichmann. Questioning the veracity of the statements or the motives behind 
them does not seem to have been a consideration. For example, Hausner 
allocated “probative value of the highest order” to the affidavits of Dieter 
Wisliceny, who had been a high-ranking member of Eichmann’s unit.112 
The fact that Wisliceny severely incriminated Eichmann, but at the same 
time exculpated himself, should have made his statements doubtful.113 This 
simple reliance on Nuremberg affidavits was also not consistent with the 
standards of 1961. German prosecutors had begun to realize how much con-
cocting of statements had gone on in Nuremberg, and they had begun to 
reach out to a new pool of witnesses to penetrate established lines of de-
fense.114 
Wisliceny had been executed in Slovakia, but most other affiants 
were still alive.115 When Hausner submitted post-war affidavits of former 
  
428, 433 (2001) (stating that Servatius was suspicious of Israeli authorities monitoring his 
communications with Eichmann). 
111 See LANDSMAN, supra note 98, at 60–61, 68–72, 107–09 (drawing an interesting com-
parison between ordinary legal practice in the U.S. and the Eichmann trial); 5 MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 2056 (stating that Servatius did not ask any questions to most 
survivor witnesses, because, as he himself expressed, “I had too much respect and reverence 
for their suffering to attack these witnesses by petty questioning.”). 
112 See 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 204–05. Co-prosecutor Gabriel Bach re-
ferred in the same way to the affidavits of Kurt Becher, an SS-officer and highly dubious 
figure, “[W]e shall ask the court to consider Becher’s statement to be trustworthy,” even 
while the prosecution considered him among the “criminal offenders against the Jewish 
People . . . .” 2 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 730–31. 
113 One particularly strange statement by Wisliceny, as summarizied by Hausner, was that 
when the “Commissars’ Order was extended so as to apply to the destruction of all Jews, 
Eichmann saw in that a way of liquidating other Jewish groups.” 5 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 60, at 2003. This is contrary to everything known about the history and purpose of 
the “Commissar Order.” In his police interrogations Eichmann commented on how outra-
geous he found Wisliceny’s statements. See 8 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, STATE OF ISRAEL, THE 
TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN 2491–2561 (1995). See generally Dan Michman, Täteraussagen 
und Geschichtswissenschaft. Der Fall Dieter Wisliceny und der Entscheidungsprozeß zur 
“Endlösung,” in DEUTSCHE, JUDEN, VÖLKERMORD: DER HOLOCAUST ALS GESCHICHTE UND 
GEGENWART 205 (Jürgen Matthäus & Klaus-Michael Mallmann eds., 2006) (providing the 
only positive evaluation of Wisliceny statements).   
114 See Birn, supra note 95, at 468 (on necessity to locate new witnesses). 
115 Another affiant, often quoted by Hausner, Rudolf Höss, former commander of Ausch-
witz, had been executed in Poland. RUDOLF HÖSS, DEATH DEALER: THE MEMOIRS OF THE SS 
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Nazis as evidence, Eichmann’s defense counsel objected and requested that 
the six affiants, who were alive, should be called, so that he could cross-
examine them. Hausner switched to his role as Attorney General and de-
clared that he would not grant safe passage to Nazi criminals to enter and 
leave the country.116 The debate between Hausner and Servatius became 
quite heated. The court, seemingly overtaxed by the situation, finally opted 
that evidence should be taken on commission in the witnesses’ country of 
residence.117 Through this decision, Servatius lost any possibility to attack 
the witnesses’ credibility because Germany and Austria do not have an 
equivalent to common-law cross-examination.118 
It would also have been essential for the defense to attack the credi-
bility of affiants and affidavits in front of the District Court.119 Servatius had 
been defense counsel in Nuremberg, he was well aware—as he pointed out 
repeatedly in Jerusalem—of the defense strategies cooked up in Nuremberg 
prison. Hausner denied free passage for the witnesses that defense wanted to 
call as well. 
  
KOMMANDANT AT AUSCHWITZ 197 (Steven Paskuly ed., Andrew Pollinger trans., Da capo 
Press 1996) (1992). 
116 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 247. Hausner’s knowledge about the back-
ground of affiants on whose statements he was prepared to rely seems to have been quite 
sketchy. He made two exceptions, one concerned a major perpetrator. See 1 MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 245–49, 508. Zeug knew that Walter Huppenkothen had been 
“Commander of Security Police” in Lublin from 1940–41 and, therefore, heavily involved in 
the persecution of Jews in the Lublin district. He pointed this out to the prosecution, but it 
was too late. See ZEUG, supra note 21 (May 7, 1961). Hausner was also not familiar with all 
the facts concerning Eberhard von Thadden, an important collaborator of Eichmann in the 
Foreign Office. Servatius filled the gaps. See 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 249–
52. 
117 See 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 245–59, 501–02; 2 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 93, at 644–46. Hausner introduced the affidavits of Höttl, Huppenkothen, Thad-
den, Jüttner, Becher, Grell. See 5 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 1874–1922; see 
also HAUSNER, supra note 41, at 374–87 (providing Hausner’s distorted version of the se-
quence of events).  
118 See 5 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 2222 (noting the irregularities in proce-
dure between German and Austrian courts, which Servatius used as a ground for appeal).  
119 See ZEUG, REPORT TO WOLF, PROSECUTION OFFICE [Staatsanwaltschaft] FRANKFURT 
(July 5, 1961) (on file with the Fritz-Bauer-Institut, Frankfurt am Main, Germany). As the 
judges taking the depositions were not familiar with the facts, they simply let the affiants 
give their statements. In one case, the court representative even provided the list of questions 
to the affiant ahead of the hearing. Id. Surprisingly, given that they were all under investiga-
tion, some of the affiants tried to disassociate themselves from their prior statements against 
Eichmann. See 5 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 1895–1900, 1908–12. Gabriel Bach 
defended the use of affidavits in the following way: “[I]t has become possible to present the 
Court with a complete picture by means of these testimonies, which is more reliable and 
more weighty than is the evidence of witnesses who are able to come here and testify as to 
what occurred sixteen years ago.” 2 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 732. 
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Hausner not only blocked the customary rights of the defense, but 
also legitimized the exculpatory stories of major perpetrators. The 1948 
affidavit by Hans Jüttner serves as a good example.120 Jüttner claimed that 
he had been on the road to Budapest in November of 1944 when he encoun-
tered foot-marches of Jews who had been driven out of Budapest under ter-
rible conditions. Incensed by this cruelty and injustice—so Jüttner’s story 
continues—he immediately went to see the Higher SS and Police Leader in 
Budapest, Otto Winkelmann, to lodge a complaint. Winkelmann regretted 
that he was entirely powerless, as a certain Eichmann was in charge. A rep-
resentative of Eichmann was summoned, but stated that Jüttner was in no 
position to give him any orders. To do justice to this story, one has to keep 
in mind that Winkelmann, an SS general, was as Higher SS and Police 
Leader superior to Eichmann and was in fact a major perpetrator of the Hol-
ocaust in Hungary. Jüttner, also a general, was head of an SS Main Office 
and had come to Hungary because of the SS takeover of a major armament 
concern through the means of blackmail of its Jewish owners. Two generals 
swore that they had been entirely powerless before a Lieutenant-Colonel—
and, of course, were unaware of and appalled by the crimes committed 
against the Jews of Hungary.121 By 1960 the prosecutor’s office in Frankfurt 
had during its investigation of Eichmann’s unit in Hungary concluded that 
realities were different. Winkelmann was named a co-accused.122 
B. Empowerment of Victims? 
Many commentators suggest the greatest achievement of the Eich-
mann trial was that it empowered Holocaust victims by giving them a 
voice.123 To quote Lawrence Douglas: “By placing the Holocaust at the le-
  
120 See 2 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 731–33 (introducing the affidavit to the 
court); 9 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, STATE OF ISRAEL, THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN (1992) 
(affidavit of Hans Jüttner at Nuremberg, dated May 3, 1948, introduced in the Eichmann 
Trial as B 06-1287, exhibit T/692). 
121 See Jan Erik Schulte, Der Mann im Hintergrund der Waffen-SS, in DIE SS: ELITE UNTER 
DEM TOTENKOPF 276 (Ronald Smelser & Enrico Syring eds., 2000) (describing Jüttner’s role 
in the SS); RUTH BETTINA BIRN, DIE HÖHEREN SS-UND POLIZEIFÜHRER: HIMMLERS 
VERTRETER IM REICH UND IN DEN BESETZTEN GEBIETEN 177–79, 297–304, 348 (1986). De-
spite his well-documented involvement in the Holocaust in Hungary, Winkelmann escaped 
prosecution by the Americans in Nuremberg, in Hungary and in Germany. One can only 
assume that this was due to the fact that the responsibilities of a Higher SS and Police Leader 
were difficult to understand and that Eichmann’s role in Hungary figured prominently. Id.  
122 Decision by Regional Higher Court [Oberlandesgericht], Frankfurt am Main (Aug. 21, 
1961) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file 
number B 162/5351).  
123 See, e.g., LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND 
HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 6 (2001) (“[The Eichmann trial] helped to re-
move an episode of unprecedented atrocity from the silences of shame . . . .”); Debórah 
Dwork, Foreword to HARRY MULISCH, CRIMINAL CASE 40/61, THE TRIAL OF ADOLF 
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gal fore of the trial, and by satisfying the testimonial need of survivor-
witnesses, the Eichmann trial offered a far more comprehensive and, from 
the perspective of the survivors, more satisfying treatment of the traumatic 
history presented in incomplete fashion at Nuremberg.”124 Indeed, Haus-
ner’s case rested on over a hundred witnesses; some of whom could speak 
about Eichmann or had been the victims of his actions, but the majority of 
whom had no connection to Eichmann. This group provided a general de-
piction of the Holocaust created by Hausner according to his overall politi-
cally-inspired design. Rachel Auerbach, in charge of the collection of wit-
ness statements at Yad Vashem and herself a survivor of the Warsaw Ghet-
to, worked with the prosecution and recalled how everybody agreed to in-
clude not only “indirect” witnesses, but also “sufferings of the Jewish-
people witnesses” as well.125 The judges were not happy with the special 
dynamics created in the courtroom by the tales of terrible suffering by sur-
vivors—important in their own right, but often not shedding any light on the 
criminal responsibility of Eichmann.126  
One of the most dramatic and frequently mentioned testimonies was 
given by Rivka Yosselevska.127 She described the destruction of her small 
  
EICHMANN: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT, at xxii (Robert Naborn trans., 2005) (“For the first 
time, survivors were prominent, present and publicly vocal. . . . The voices of the survivors 
and the suffering of the victims were acknowledged, honored and legitimized.”); Martti 
Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. FOR U.N. LAW. 1, 10 
(2002); SHOSHANA FELMAN, THE JURIDICAL UNCONSCIOUS: TRIALS AND TRAUMAS IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 126 (2002). Felman’s endorsement is particularly fulsome: 
It is this revolutionary transformation of the victim that makes the victim’s story 
happen for the first time and happen as a legal act of authorship of history. This 
historically unprecedented revolution in the victim that was operated in and by the 
Eichmann trial is, I would suggest, the trial’s major contribution not only to Jews 
but to history, to law, to culture—to humanity at large.  
Id. at 300.  
124 Lawrence Douglas, History and Memory in the Courtroom: Reflections on Perpetrator 
Trials, in THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SINCE 1945, at 95, 100 
(Herbert R. Reginbogin & Christoph J.M. Safferling eds., 2006).  
125 Auerbach, supra note 80, at 46. 
126 See, e.g., 3 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 1122–27 (noting the exchange with 
the witness, Zvi Zimmermann); LANDSMAN, supra note 98, at 104; 5 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, 
supra note 60, at 2082–83. The judges made references to this problem in the decision, not-
ing that iconic figure like the Warsaw ghetto fighters were called, while Eichmann had noth-
ing to do with the suppression of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 1943. Id.  
127 See Auerbach, supra note 80, at 49, 51; Lawrence Douglas, Rivka Yoselewska on the 
Stand: The Structure of Legality and the Construction of Heroic Memory at the Eichmann 
Trial, in 2 LAW AND LITERATURE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 285, 297–300 (Michael Freeman 
& Andrew Lewis eds., 1999); DOV SCHMORAK, SIEBEN SAGEN AUS: ZEUGEN IM EICHMANN-
PROZESS 192–208 (1962); SEGEV, supra note 1, at 351, 355–56; YABLONKA, supra note 1, at 
3–4, 111–12 (describing Yoselewska’s testimony as “the most horrific of all testimonies at 
the trial,” and her story as “different, personal and completely lacking in generalization”).  
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community, Pohost Zagorodski in Belarus, by two mass-murder actions. In 
the second action in 1942, her whole family was killed, including her child 
in her arms. She was wounded and fell into the mass grave, but she man-
aged to crawl out during the night. Testifying in court seems to have come 
at a price for her: on the scheduled day she could not appear because of a 
heart attack.128 Hausner relates that she almost fainted when the police came 
to interview her and that her family asked that she be excused. Hausner, 
however, wanted the testimony in because of its dramatic potential.129 He 
interpreted Rivka Yosselevka’s escape from the grave as a symbol of the 
Jewish people emerging from the grave and finding new life in the state of 
Israel. “Rivka Yoselewska embodies in her person all that was perpetrated, 
all that happened to the Jewish people . . . . Rivka Yoselewska symbolizes 
the entire Jewish people.”130  
While even recent literature states that Yosselevska was shot by 
“Eichmann’s men,”131 it was well-established in 1961 that Eichmann had 
nothing to do with it (nor did the Einsatzgruppen, associated by Hausner 
with Eichmann). The person responsible, Alfred Renndorfer, had been iden-
tified in 1959. He was the head of the Security Police Post in Hansewitsche, 
and Pohost Zagorodski belonged to his district. Investigations by the Central 
Agency (and other state attorneys’ offices) from 1959 on had established 
that the local Security Police apparatus was responsible for the murder of 
the Jewish population in Belarus in 1942.132 The first action in 1941 de-
scribed by Yosselevska also had nothing to do with Eichmann. It was perpe-
trated by the SS-Kavallerieregiment 2, which was subordinate to Himmler’s 
Special Command Staff (Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS). The commander 
of the unit, Franz Magill, was under investigation since 1960.133 Presumably 
because of Zeug’s reports, the attorney’s office in charge of the Renndorfer 
case in 1961 sent a request to the Israel Police that Yosselevska should be 
  
128 See 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 499, 514–18.  
129 HAUSNER, supra note 41, at 73–74 (“Her story shattered the courtroom. . . . [L]oud 
sobbing was heard from the audience, and tears flowed freely from many eyes.”); see also id. 
at 453.  
130 5 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 2004. 
131 YABLONKA, supra note 1, at 3 (describing how “Eichmann’s men” shot at and killed 
Rivka Yoselewska’s family members and village).  
132 Case Against Alfred Renndorfer and Wilhelm Daditschek, Central Agency file number 
202 AR-Z 95/59 (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg 
branch, file numbers B 162/3407–3418, 3422). Eichmann’s section, IVB4, was not part of 
the chain of command. The Superior Commander of the Security Police [Befehlshaber der 
Sicherheitspolizei] in charge of Belarus held a higher rank than Eichmann. Id.  
133 Case Against Franz Magill, Central Agency file number AR-Z 296/60 (on file with the 
German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file numbers B 162/2324-
2326). The mass-shooting in Pohost-Zagorodski was part of the allegations against Magill. 
Id.  
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asked to give a statement. She did not.134 While no reason is indicated, it is 
possible that she did not want to go through the ordeal of testifying in court 
a second time. What remains is that she testified against Eichmann, but not 
against the murderer of her family.  
Yosselevska’s case raises questions about the claim that victims 
were empowered in the Eichmann trial.135 Inevitably, the scope for a wit-
ness’s account is limited in a criminal court setting, as fairness and due pro-
cess impose certain limitations. Beyond these requirements, Hausner uti-
lized victim statements selectively, using only snippets that fit into his rhe-
torical edifice, without much consideration for either the probative value for 
the case against Eichmann or the broader experiences of the witnesses 
themselves. Yosselevska had given a statement about her experiences to a 
Yad Vashem researcher in 1960, which included a lot more than the poign-
ant scene of the mass shooting.136 Telford Taylor suggested separating trial 
from witness testimony, having the latter heard in form of an inquest.137 As 
we know from the example of Truth Commissions, such a format can give 
greater self-determination to victims.138 
  
134 PROSECUTION OFFICE (Staatsanwaltschaft) MÜNCHEN I TO CENTRAL AGENCY (Nov. 24, 
1961) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file 
number B 162/3419). A statement by Yosselevska could not be found in the files of the Cen-
tral Agency, or the Prosecution Office or the Criminal Police [Landeskriminalamt] in Mün-
chen. She is not listed as a witness in the indictment, Indictment against Alfred Renndorfer 
and Wilhelm Daditschek (Apr. 2, 1964) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bun-
desarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B 162/3416). Renndorfer was, among other 
crimes, sentenced for the killing of the Jewish population of Pohost Zagorodski. He received 
the very low sentence of five years, Judgment against Alfred Renndorfer and Wilhelm Dad-
itschek (Nov. 22, 1966) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Lud-
wigsburg branch, file number B 162/3416).  
135 See YABLONKA, supra note 1, at 3–4 (mentioning an interview with Yosselvska, in 
which her feelings in respect of her testimony at the Eichmann trial were not discussed); E-
mail from Hanna Yablonka to Ruth Bettina Birn (Nov. 11, 2010) (on file with author). There 
are some discrepancies between Yablonka’s account and Hausner’s account. Id. at 97, 108, 
111–12; HAUSNER, supra note 41, at 73–74. See generally  Judith Stern, The Eichmann Trial 
and Its Influence on Psychiatry and Psychology, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 393, 419–22 
(2000) (it seems no interviews with survivor witnesses about their experiences at the trial 
were conducted).  
136 Deposition of Rivka Yosselevska, taken by the Oral History Division of Yad Vashem 
(Jan. 10, 1961) (recorded Dec. 10, 1960) (on file with the Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem, 
file reference No 0.3/2054)  
137 See Taylor, supra note 106, at 25 (“There is no reason why . . . the Israeli Government 
could not conduct a proceeding in the nature of an inquest . . . which . . . precedes and fur-
nishes the basis for an accusation.”). 
138 Not all Truth Commissions achieved this aim, however. The literature on this subject is 
extensive.  See, e.g., PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE 
OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2002) (exploring twenty major truth commissions around the 
world). 
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Hausner’s lack of consideration for the complete story of victims is 
demonstrated by another witness prominently discussed in the literature.139 
Ada Lichtman was asked to testify about the persecution of the Jewish pop-
ulation in her home town in Poland in the early period of the German occu-
pation. Hausner’s promptings—“Can you remember the old Jew who was 
carrying his paralyzed grandson? Tell us what happened to that Jew.”140—
show that he had preselected the components of Lichtman’s story he wanted 
to use.141 In his summing-up Hausner generalized the acts of cruelty de-
scribed by Lichtman as “the mode of operation in the Generalgouverne-
ment” and suggested similarities between East and West,142 but Eichmann 
was, again, not responsible for the crimes Lichtman described. However, at 
a later time Lichtman was deported to Sobibor. Zeug, in the course of his 
investigation on Sobibor, had had her questioned by the Israel Police on 
March 30, 1960. Eichmann’s office was instrumental for deportations from 
Western Europe to Sobibor and Lichtman could have legitimately spoken in 
Jerusalem, as she did at other occasions, about her ordeal in this death 
camp.143 
C. On Show Trials and Narratives  
Some recent commentators on the Eichmann trial advocate diver-
sions from strict legality in favour of didactic purposes.144 According to 
Douglas, the trial was an “extraordinary success, creating a site of remem-
brance and commemoration that served to confer iconic significance upon 
  
139 See Douglas, supra note 124, at 97–122. It is striking that Douglas shows no interest in 
the witnesses beyond their appearance in the courtroom, treating them as figures in a theatre 
performance. Id. Douglas uses theatre-related expressions like “dramaturgy of prosecution.” 
Douglas, supra note 127, at 300.  Similarly, he uses the expression “greatest moments of 
melodrama.” DOUGLAS, supra note 123, at 170.  The characterization of witnesses as figures 
in a theatre performance is also evident in the works of Shoshana Felman.  See FELMAN, 
supra note 123. 
140 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 326. 
141 See id. at 323–26. Hausner was aware that Lichtman could testify about Sobibor but did 
not call her on that. Id.  
142 5 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 2000. 
143 ZEUG TO KERMISZ AT YAD VASHEM (Dec. 1, 1960) (on file with the German Federal 
Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B 162/4425); STATEMENT OF 
ADA LICHTMAN (Apr. 23, 1963) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], 
Ludwigsburg branch, file number B 162/4431). Lichtman’s husband also had been in So-
bibor, where his first wife and children were murdered. See Barbara Distel, Vernich-
tungslager Sobibór, in 8 DER ORT DES TERRORS: GESCHICHTE DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN 
KONZENTRATIONSLAGER 375–404 (Angelika Königseder ed., 2008). 
144 See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 124; FELMAN, supra note 123; BILSKY, supra note 13; 
Shapira, supra note 107. 
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the Holocaust.”145 Earlier commentators like Hannah Arendt (and, by impli-
cation, the Jerusalem District Court) are criticized for promoting the “un-
necessarily restrictive vision” that “the sole purpose of a trial is to render 
justice.”146 Hausner, on the other hand, is applauded for his “capacious view 
of the trial,” which made the prosecution the “defender of narrative and 
memory against the court’s rigid dedication to traditional trial form.”147 
What really matters, it is argued, is the grand narrative created, the court-
room drama. Following Mark Osiel: “To maximize their pedagogic impact, 
such trials should be unabashedly designed as monumental spectacles.”148 
As a safeguard against abuse, Douglas stipulates that such historical trials 
should be conducted “responsibly.”149 Osiel, in his “defense of liberal show 
trials” considers the intentions decisive: “Whether show trials are defensible 
depends on what the state intends to show and how it will show it.”150 What 
this commentary omits are the role of the law in creating a sphere outside of 
the influence of government and the function of procedural rules in ensuring 
fairness and equality before the law, as well as considerations of the content 
of narratives. To what extent does a narrative have to reflect the facts, in a 
case like the Eichmann trial, reflect the historical record? Is it also permissi-
  
145 DOUGLAS, supra note 123, at 260.  
146 Douglas, supra note 124, at 97. Compare id. (adding that “it is unrealistic to expect and 
silly to demand that the trial be conducted as an ordinary exercise of the criminal law”), with 
FELMAN, supra note 123, at 305–06 (“[T]he function of the trial was not to create a legal 
precedent but to create a legal narrative, a legal language and a legal culture that were not yet 
in existence but that became essential for the articulation of the unprecedented nature of the 
genocidal crime.”). 
147 DOUGLAS, supra note 123, at 144, 150. Douglas uses the expression “capacious” repeat-
edly throughout the book. See id. The expression signals justified disregard of procedural 
rules, but, because the term is so ill-defined, there is no indication when and under which 
circumstances breaking the rules is permissible. 
148 Mark J. Osiel, In Defense of Liberal Show Trials—Nuremberg and Beyond, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 704, 705 (Guenael Mettraux ed., 2008). Osiel bases 
his analysis on JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS (1986) 
(originally published in 1964) (arguing that procedural fairness, as a liberal value, is re-
quired).  
149 Douglas, supra note 124, at 97 (considering a procedurally fair trial a basic requirement, 
but not addressing the inherent tension between procedural requirements and didactic inten-
tions). 
150 Osiel, supra note 148, at 706. Other authors echo this requirement. See, e.g., Gary J. 
Bass, The Adolf Eichmann Case: Universal and National Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 88 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004). Some authors hold the more con-
ventional view that a trial automatically vindicating the prosecutor’s position is a show trial. 
See, e.g., Koskenniemi, supra note 123, at 404. Shapira sees courtroom drama and the avoid-
ance of boredom as valid considerations. Shapira, supra note 107, at 23 (“It is true that the 
documents were more incriminating; yet whenever the prosecution presented such docu-
ments, the bored journalists headed straight for the snack bar.”). 
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ble to disregard the narrow confines of “legalism” to create a politically 
inspired, distorted depiction of history?151 
This brings us back to the major problem in the Eichmann trial, the 
discrepancy between Eichmann’s real role and the exaggerated image creat-
ed by Hausner. As pointed out earlier in this article, the District Court—in 
particular the Presiding Judge Moshe Landau—tried its best to keep the 
focus on evidence concerning the accused rather than the Holocaust in gen-
eral. In its judgment, the court stated explicitly that it saw the function of 
the trial in deciding on the culpability of Eichmann, not in a comprehensive 
depiction of a period in history.152 But, although the fact-oriented judgment 
of the District Court came closer to documenting Eichmann’s role in the 
Holocaust, the Hausner narrative re-emerged in the judgment of the Su-
preme Court.153 The discrepancy between history and image became partic-
  
151 A particularly troubling example is the attempt to construct a close link between Eich-
mann and the former Mufti of Jerusalem, as requested by Golda Meir. According to Hanna 
Yablonka, Bureau 06 was opposed to this. YABLONKA, supra note 1, at 84–86. Hausner was 
more obliging. Here, again, he utilized the affidavits of Wisliceny. 1 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 6, at 243–44; 2 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 914–15; 3 MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 1138–44; 5 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 2028–29. The 
judgment followed, to a large extent, Hausner’s view. See id. at 2169. In his book, Hausner 
claimed that close links existed. HAUSNER, supra note 42, at 345–46. According to Eich-
mann, he had met the Mufti once at a reception, and some Arab officers were sent to his 
office for an informational visit. 4 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 1451–52; 7 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 63, at 357–59, 551–70. The Mufti resided in Berlin during 
the war. While he was sympathetic to the Nazi cause, his political influence was quite lim-
ited. A whole genre of books is devoted to exaggerating his role. See, e.g., SIMON 
WIESENTHAL, GROSSMUFTI: GROSSAGENT DER ACHSE (1947).  
152 5 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 2082.  
In this maze of insistent questions, the path of the Court was and remains clear. It 
cannot allow itself to be enticed into provinces which are outside its sphere . . . .  
It is the purpose of every criminal trial to clarify whether the charges in the prose-
cution’s indictment against the accused who is on trial are true . . . . Everything 
which requires clarification in order that these purposes may be achieved, must be 
determined at trial, and everything else which is foreign to these purposes must be 
entirely eliminated from the court procedure. 
Id. 
153 See 5 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 2368.  
As a matter of fact the Appellant did not receive any orders ‘from above’ at all; it 
was he who was supreme, he who was the commander in all that pertains to Jewish 
Affairs . . . . Yet that idea might not have assumed so satanic and infernal an ex-
pression—in the bodies of millions of tortured and martyred Jews—but for the 
thorough planning, the zeal, the fanatical enthusiasm, and the insatiable blood-
thirstiness of the Appellant and those who did his bidding.  
Id.; see also id. at 2369 (“Even as there is no word in human speech to describe acts such as 
the acts of the Appellant, so there is no punishment in human laws sufficiently grave to 
match the guilt of the Appellant.”). According to Pnina Lahav, the Supreme Court judge who 
wrote this part was suffering from the loss of relatives during the Holocaust.  LAHAV, supra 
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ularly visible in Hausner’s cross-examination of Eichmann. Zeug was not 
the only observer to comment negatively on this part of the trial.154 Hausner, 
due to his lack of in-depth knowledge, made unfounded allegations that 
Eichmann easily refuted.155 Hausner was also not able to see and seize upon 
admissions Eichmann made. Hausner relied on an aggressive and bullying 
tone, causing interventions by the Presiding Judge. The scene deteriorated 
into what some media commentators called a “show trial.”156 The trial rec-
ord has several examples of Eichmann denying a (false) fact put to him by 
Hausner, which created unrest in the audience.157  
Many of Hausner’s false claims have a continuing impact to this 
day.158 The trial’s influence on memory is also ambiguous. While the trial 
was instrumental in creating space for suppressed memory, false memory 
appeared as well. Some survivors, presumably due to the highly publicized 
event, did not differentiate between recollection and imagination.159 Perpe-
  
note 13, at 157–58 (“Silberg was an open wound.”).  Even sympathetic viewers commented 
on Hausner’s demonization of Eichmann.  See BERND NELLESSEN, DER PROZESS VON 
JERUSALEM. EIN DOKUMENT 12 (1964). 
154 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (July 15, 1961); MULISCH, supra note 123; ZENTRALE 
RECHTSSCHUTZSTELLE TO ALL EMBASSIES [alle Vertretungen] (Sept. 30, 1961) (on file with 
the Archives of Foreign Ministry [Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts], Berlin, file 
number B 80/466). 
155 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (July 15, 1961, July 28, 1961). 
156 See id. In response to a question from Judge Halevi, Eichmann admitted to having 
drawn up time tables for resettlements from the East to KL Lublin. This was new. According 
to Zeug, Hausner became more careful after negative comments in the media. Id. 
157 Eichmann denied, correctly, knowing of the final solution in the sense of extermination 
in early 1941. 4 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 1618–19. He answered, equally 
correctly, to the question: “Were you not Heydrich’s Specialist Officer?” with “No, I was not 
Heydrich’s Specialist Officer for the Final Solution of the Jewish Question. I was a Specialist 
Officer on Jewish Affairs under Müller.” Id. at 1621.  He also correctly asserted that he re-
ceived his orders in Hungary from the HSSPF and the Commander of the Security Police, not 
directly from Berlin. Id. at 1773–74. The trial record indicates, that the Presiding Judge had 
to quell unrest in court. There are other examples for unfounded allegations made in cross-
examination. 
158 Gabriel Bach, former member of the prosecution team and an influential commentator 
during the fifty years anniversary, repeated in 2006, that Eichmann “was in charge of all the 
steps taken to implement the demonic plan for the so-called ‘Final Solution of the Jewish 
Problem,’” as well as the other allegations Hausner had made. Bach, supra note 41, at 216. 
After the trial, 48.3% of Israeli youth were under the impression that Eichmann was one of 
the top leaders. See AKIVA W. DEUTSCH, THE EICHMANN TRIAL IN THE EYES OF ISRAELI 
YOUNGSTERS 48 (1974); see also MULISCH, supra note 123, 50–51; Eichmann-Prozeß, supra 
note 39. 
159 One example from the trial for false recollections is the testimony of the witness Bahir. 
See 3 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 1178–82, 1188, 1219–20, 1341. Another ex-
ample found in Holocaust literature are the memoirs of a survivor, who in 1961, incorporated 
an Eichmann incident in his recollections. See JACOB FRANK & MARK LEWIS, HIMMLER’S 
JEWISH TAILOR: THE STORY OF HOLOCAUST SURVIVOR JACOB FRANK 119–23 (2000). 
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trators used the highly charged atmosphere of the trial for their own ends. A 
Security Police leader responsible for mass shootings in the Pinsk district, 
close to the area where Yosselevska had lived, invented as a defense an 
order by Eichmann.160  
As this article demonstrates, in 1961 it would have been possible to 
conduct a trial reflecting Eichmann’s crimes more accurately.161 The public 
impact need not have been affected, due to television coverage and the pres-
ence of hundreds of journalists. There were enough survivors linked to 
Eichmann’s crimes to make the suffering of victims visible. What would 
have been needed was, as Zeug stated, outreach to other agencies and more 
time and hard work. Zeug, based on his observations, saw the reason why 
this did not happen in a mix between ignorance and nationalistic tenden-
cies—the wish to do it alone. He also saw no sign that Hausner was much 
inclined to overcome the weaknesses of his case.162 And, as we know, what 
stood against a trial of the “real” Eichmann was the Israeli government’s 
intention to use the trial as a stage on which to display a politically usable 
past. 
  
160 Interrogation of Wilhelm Rasp (Dec. 18, 1961) (on file with the German Federal Ar-
chives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg branch, file number B 162/5801). The interrogation of 
Rasp’s deputy shows that the story was invented. Interrogation of Heinrich Geigenscheder 
(Dec. 20, 1961) (on file with the German Federal Archives [Bundesarchiv], Ludwigsburg 
branch, file number B 162/5801). That the story was a fabrication is also supported by the 
fact that Eichmann’s office was not part of the chain of command leading from Berlin to the 
Security Police sub-unit in Pinsk, headed by Rasp. Id. 
161 In 1961, prosecutors had more detailed knowledge about the history of the Holocaust 
than historians. 
162 See ZEUG, supra note 21 (May 29, 1961, July 15, 1961, July 28, 1961, Aug. 17, 1961). 
How “capacious” Hausner’s views were is illustrated by the following sequence: When the 
prosecution wanted to call a witness on the flight of Jews to the partisans, which had nothing 
to do with Eichmann, Hausner responded,  
I know that it is not the Court’s wish that we attempt to depict the Holocaust fully, 
for the Court desires—and, with all due respect, rightly so—to confine the matters 
brought before it only to the indictment against the Accused. But, in our view, this 
also relates to the Accused. They fled from these hardships which the Accused 
brought upon them—they were forced to hide, and everything they underwent 
came from the Accused, if not directly, at least indirectly.  
3 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 1341. 
